Abstract. We present a new non-interactive public key distribution system based on the class group of a non-maximal imaginary quadratic order Cl(∆p). The main advantage of our system over earlier proposals based on (Z/nZ) * [19, 21] is that embedding id information into group elements in a cyclic subgroup of the class group is easy (straight-forward embedding into prime ideals suffices) and secure, since the entire class group is cyclic with very high probability. In order to compute discrete logarithms in the class group, the KGC needs to know the prime factorization of ∆p = ∆1p
Introduction
Public-key cryptography is undoubtedly one of the core techniques used to enable authentic, non-repudiable and confidential communication. However, a general problem inherent in public-key systems is that one needs to ensure the authenticity of a given public key. The most common way to solve this problem is to introduce a trusted third party, called a Certification Authority (CA), which is-and p 2 , and the workload for the KGC is consequently very high. Furthermore, since one chooses p i −1 smooth and uses Pohlig-Hellman's simplification together with Shank's Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm, the time needed for generating k user keys is proportional to k.
In contrast, we use two different subexponential algorithms for the key generation. After the initial computation of relations over the factor bases, the workload for each individual key generation is very modest. For the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group of the maximal order, Cl(∆ 1 ), we use an analogue of the Self-Initializing Quadratic Sieve (SIQS) factoring algorithm [14, 13] and for the computation of discrete logarithms in F * p we use the Special Number Field Sieve, which recently was used for the solution of McCurley's challenge [24] . This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide the necessary background and notation for non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. The next section contains the discrete logarithm algorithm for arbitrary non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders, and in Section 4 we present our new non-interactive public key cryptosystem. In order to save space, the proofs of most results have been omitted. These proofs, as well as computational results, will be given in the full paper [10] .
Non-maximal Imaginary Quadratic Orders
The basic notions of imaginary quadratic number fields can be found in [1, 2] . For a more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between maximal and non-maximal orders we refer to [5, 9, 12] .
Let O ∆ f denote the non-maximal quadratic order of discriminant Ideal equivalence is denoted by a ∼ b, and the class of all ideals equivalent to a is denoted by [a] . Throughout, we will use ∆ without subscript to denote the discriminant of an arbitrary quadratic order, maximal or non-maximal. Our cryptosystem makes use of the relationship between a non-maximal order of conductor f and its corresponding maximal order. Any non-maximal order can be represented as
It is well-known that all O ∆ f -ideals prime to the conductor are invertible, and in every ideal equivalence class there is an ideal which is prime to any given number. We denote the principal O ∆ f -ideals prime to f by P ∆ f (f ) and all fractional ideals which are prime to f by I ∆ f (f ). There is an isomorphism 
Thus we are able to switch to and from ideals in the maximal and non-maximal orders via the map ϕ. The algorithms GoToMaxOrder(a, f) to compute ϕ
and GoToNonMaxOrder(A, f) to compute ϕ can be found in [9] .
It is important to note that the isomorphism ϕ is between the ideal groups I ∆1 (f ) and I ∆ f (f ) and not the class groups. If, for A, B ∈ I ∆1 (f ) we have A ∼ B, it is not necessarily true that ϕ(A) ∼ ϕ(B). On the other hand, equivalence does hold under ϕ −1 . More precisely we have the following:
We now focus on the kernel Ker(φ
−1
Cl ) of this map, which will turn out to be of central importance for the computation of discrete logarithms in Cl(∆ f ). In particular, we will need to compute discrete logarithms of elements in Ker(φ Cl ) as ideal equivalence classes is completely inadequate for this purpose since we would have to compute discrete logarithms in Cl(∆ f ). Fortunately, there exists an alternative representation which allows us to reduce the problem of computing discrete logarithms in Ker(φ
Cl ) to that in a small number of finite fields.
This homomorphism suggests the following representation for ideal classes in the kernel: 
* , is also a generator representation for the class of a. This means that we have
* , as illustrated by the exact sequence (7.27) in [5, p.147] .
Our reduction of the discrete logarithm problem in Cl(∆ f ) to Cl(∆ 1 ) and finite fields requires computing various preimages of elements in Ker(φ 
Algorithm 1 Std2Gen
Input:
Cl ), and the conductor f.
In this section we generalize the result from [12] . We show that given the conductor f and its prime factorization one can reduce the DLP in an arbitrary Cl(∆ f ) to the DLP in various smaller groups. More precisely, we first show that the computation of discrete logarithms in Cl(∆ f ) can be reduced to the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group Cl(∆ 1 ) of the maximal order and the computation of discrete logarithms in Ker(φ
Cl ). Furthermore, we show that the latter problem boils down to the computation of discrete logarithms in a small number of finite fields.
It should be noted that our method here is in essence a special case of the more general methods employed by Cohen et al. to compute discrete logarithms in ray class groups [3] . The class group of a non-maximal order in any number field, not only degree 2, can be viewed as a ray class group of the maximal order, where the modulus is simply an integer, the conductor of the non-maximal order. Our exposition here is a reformulation of these results in terms of the simpler, special case of non-maximal orders using the language of [12] . In addition, we prove that the reduction of the DLP in Cl(∆ f ) to computing discrete logarithm computations in Cl(∆ 1 ) and a small number of finite fields is of polynomial complexity.
We start with an algorithm which reduces the DLP in Cl(∆ f ) to the DLP in Cl(∆ 1 ) and Ker(φ
Cl ) given in Proposition 3 induces the isomorphism Ker(φ
* . Thus, our algorithm makes use of the following two methods:
Accepts two reduced O ∆1 -ideals G, A as input and returns x ∈ Z with 0 ≤
* as input and returns x ∈ Z with 0 ≤ x < |Ker(φ
Cl ), or x = −1 if no such x exists. Furthermore, we assume that h(∆ 1 ) is known. This is no practical restriction, since the best currently known algorithm [14, 13] for computing discrete logarithms in Cl(∆ 1 ) needs to compute h(∆ 1 ) and the group structure of Cl(∆ 1 ) before the actual DL-computation starts. Secondly, if there were any other algorithm DLPinCl with the above properties, then one could use it to compute h(∆ 1 ), as shown in the full paper [10] .
Algorithm 2 (ReduceDLP) reduces the DLP in Cl(∆ f ) to the DLP in Cl(∆ 1 ) and Ker(φ
The proof of correctness can be found in the full version of the paper [10] . Cl ). The subexponential algorithm described in [13, Algorithm 3.3] is the most efficient algorithm known for computing discrete logarithms in Cl(∆ 1 ). We now consider the DLP in Ker(φ 
We give an algorithm (ReducePe2P) for this reduction in the full version of the paper [10] .
Algorithm 2 ReduceDLP
Input: Two reduced O∆ f -ideals g, a, the conductor f, the class number h(∆1), and the order of the kernel |Ker(φ 
Proof. If the conductor f and its prime factorization are known, then one can use ReduceDLP (Algorithm 2) to reduce the DLP in Cl(∆ f ) to the DLP in Cl(∆ 1 ) and Ker(φ * for which we want to compute the discrete logarithm c such that 
. We now restrict our attention to the split case (∆ 1 /p) = 1, where we have
Since these two DLP's must be solved for the same c and l, we can combine them and obtain the single DLP in F * p
from which we can find the desired value of c. As noted in [8] , this simple strategy can be used to improve the general maps from [12, 11] ; it is shown that in this case there not only exists a surjective homomorphism
Cl ). Note that the central result of [12] now is nothing more than an immediate corollary.
Example
We illustrate the reduction of discrete logarithm computations in Cl(∆ f ) via a small example. Suppose 
That is, we want to find x such that g x ∼ a. Since g generates Cl(∆ f ), we know that such an x exists. Following ReduceDLP (Algorithm 2), we first compute
Cl (a)], and solve the discrete logarithm problem 11, 9) , and we easily compute x 1 = 9.
At this point we know that x has the form x = c · h(∆ 1 ) + x 1 = 13c + 9, and it remains to compute c. Again following ReduceDLP (Algorithm 2), we
To find α and γ we compute the principal ideals B = ϕ −1 (b) and C = ϕ −1 (c), and reduce them while simultaneously computing their modulo f O ∆1 reduced generators, which we take as α and γ. We obtain B = (311, −15) = (α) and C = (297, −13) = (γ) where
. To compute c, we need to solve the discrete logarithm problem and we combine these two discrete logarithm problems to obtain one discrete logarithm problem in F * 23 :
Solving yields c = 20, and finally x = 13 · 20 + 9 = 269. It is easy to verify that x is indeed the desired discrete logarithm: simply compute the reduced ideal g 269 and verify that it is equal to the reduced ideal a.
Towards Practical Non-interactive Cryptosystems
Before we explain our system setup we list the crucial properties:
Required Properties
1. The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in Cl(∆ p ) without knowing the factorization of ∆ p = ∆ 1 p 2 is infeasible. To determine bounds for ∆ 1 and p, we make use of the heuristic model from [7] , which is a refinement of Lenstra and Verheul's approach [16] , since it also takes into account the asymptotically vanishing o(1)-part in subexponential algorithms. We will now derive bounds for the parameters such that an attacker would need to spend about 90, 000 MIPS years to break the system. This approximately amounts to a ten-fold higher workload than the recent factorization of RSA155 and hence corresponds to the very minimum requirements. The estimates in [7, It is easy to see that the following setup satisfies all above requirements.
Preliminary experiments, together with computational experience using the subexponential algorithms from [13] and [24] , indicate that a KGC with modest computational resources, for example, a small network of Pentium processors, should be able to set up a key distribution system using p, q ≈ 2 300 at least. For such an example, we estimate that after a precomputation of about 3 days on a cluster of 16 550 Mhz Pentiums III's for computing the class group Cl(∆ 1 ), each user registration would take about 1 day on a single 550 Mhz Pentiums III, the vast majority of this time being spent on the computation of discrete logarithms in F * p . However, adding more machines to the cluster yields a linear speedup in both the precomputation stage and part of the user registration stage. Thus, although this level of complexity is far from ideal, unlike the case of (Z/nZ) * it is at least possible to set up noninteractive systems with secure parameters in Cl(∆ p ). More detailed computational results will appear in the full version of the paper [10] .
